PurposeTo examine the contribution of “values-based reasoning” in evaluating older adults’ capacity to make medical decisions.Design and MethodsOlder men with schizophrenia (n=20) or dementia (n=20), and a primary care comparison group (n=19), completed cognitive and psychiatric screening and an interview to determine their capacity to make medical decisions, which included a component on values. All of the participants were receiving treatment at Veterans Administration (VA) outpatient clinics.ResultsParticipants varied widely in the activities and relationships they most valued, the extent to which (...) religious beliefs would influence healthcare decisions, and in ratings of the importance of preserving quality versus length of life. Most participants preferred shared decision making with doctor, family, or both. Individuals with schizophrenia or dementia performed worse than a primary care comparison group in reasoning measured by the ability to list risks and benefits and compare choices. Individuals with dementia performed comparably to the primary care group in reasoning measured by the ability to justify choices in terms of valued abilities or activities, whereas individuals with schizophrenia performed relatively worse compared to the other two groups. Compared to primary care patients, participants with schizophrenia and with dementia were impaired on the ability to explain treatment choices in terms of valued relationships.ConclusionMedical decision making may be influenced by strongly held values and beliefs, emotions, and long life experience. To date, these issues have not been explicitly included in structured evaluations of medical decision-making capacity. This study demonstrated that it is possible to inquire of and elicit a range of healthcare related values and preferences from older adults with dementia or schizophrenia, and individuals with mild to moderate dementia may be able to discuss healthcare options in relation to their values. However, how best to incorporate a values assessment into a structured capacity evaluation deserves further research attention. (shrink)

We revisit Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, published twenty years ago. The evolution of the relative plausibility theory of juridical proof is offered as evidence of the advantage of a naturalized approach to the study of the field and law evidence. Various alternative explanations of aspects of juridical proof from other disciplines are examined and their shortcomings described. These competing explanations are similar in their reductive, a priori approaches that are at odds with an empirically oriented naturalized approach. (...) The shortcomings of the various a priori approaches are driven by their common methodological commitments to employing weird hypotheticals to engage in intuition mining about the American legal systems that in turn ignore important aspects of the actual legal systems and consistently make impossible epistemological demands. As a result, both their descriptions of and prescriptions for American legal systems are implausible, unlike the relative plausibility theory. (shrink)

Legal scholarship exploring the nature of evidence and the process of juridical proof has had a complex relationship with formal modeling. As evident in so many fields of knowledge, algorithmic approaches to evidence have the theoretical potential to increase the accuracy of fact finding, a tremendously important goal of the legal system. The hope that knowledge could be formalized within the evidentiary realm generated a spate of articles attempting to put probability theory to this purpose. This literature was both insightful (...) and frustrating. Much light was shed on the legal system, but it also quickly became evident that the tools of probability theory were in many ways ill-constructed for the task. Fundamental incompatibilities between the structure of legal decision making and the extant formal tools were identified, and it became evident that many of the purported explanations of legal phenomena were internally inconsistent. As a consequence, interest in this type of formal modeling declined, and attention was directed toward different kinds of explanations of the phenomena. Perhaps under the influence of a recent trend toward various types of formal modeling in legal scholarship, a recent burst of articles, rather than attempting to explain the macro structure of trials, which was the previous object of interest, attempts to quantify the probative value of various items of evidence in ways consistent with the formal features of various probability theories, and then to study decision making from that perspective. For example, the value of evidence is often purported to be its likelihood ratio, that is, the probability of discovering or receiving the evidence given a hypothesis (e.g., the defendant did it) divided by the probability of discovering or receiving the evidence given the negation of the hypothesis (the defendant didn't do it). Alternatively, the value of evidence is purported (more contextually) to be the information gain it provides, defined as the increase in probability it provides for a hypothesis above the probability of the hypothesis based on the other available evidence. Both conceptions then assume that all of the various probability assessments conform or ought to conform to the dictates of Bayes' theorem (that maintains consistency among such assessments); empirical studies are then done testing the extent to which this is so and proposing how the law can increase the probability that it is so. The general criticisms of using Bayes' theorem as a formal model of juridical proof are well known and were integral to the last wave of interest in formal modeling of the evidentiary process. This paper thus for the most part puts aside that more general issue, and focuses specifically on mathematical modeling of the value of particular items of evidence. The paper demonstrates that formal modeling has only limited value in explaining the value of legal evidence, much more limited than those constructing and discussing the models assume, and thus that the conclusions they draw about the value of evidence are unwarranted. This is done through a discussion of four recent examples that attempt to quantify evidence relating to, respectively, carpet fibers, infidelity, DNA random-match evidence, and character evidence used to impeach a witness. This article thus makes two contributions. First, and most importantly, it is another demonstration of the complex relationship between algorithmic tools and legal decision making. Second, at a minimum it points out serious pitfalls for analytical or empirical studies of juridical proof. (shrink)

A vast literature has developed probing the law's aversion to statistical/probability evidence in general and its rejection of naked statistical evidence in particular. This literature rests on false premises. At least so far as US law is concerned, there is no general aversion to statistical forms of proof and even naked statistics are admissible and sufficient for a verdict when the evidentiary proffer meets the normal standards of admissibility, the most important of which is reliability. The belief to the contrary (...) rests upon a series of mistakes: most importantly, mismodeling of the structure of legal systems and the nature of common law decision making. Contributing to these mistakes is the common methodology in this literature of relying on weird hypotheticals that mismodel the underlying legal relations and contain impossible epistemological demands. Collectively, these phenomena have distracted attention from issues that actually affect real legal systems. (shrink)

The probabilistic account of juridical proof meets insurmountable problems. A better explanation of juridical proof is that it is a form of inference to the best explanation that involves the comparative plausibility of the parties’ stories. In addition, discrete evidentiary matters such as relevance and probative value are also best understood as involving inference to the best explanation rather than being probabilistic.

There is growing acceptance among language evolution researchers that an increase in our ancestors’ theory of mind capacities was critical to the origins of language. However, little attention has been paid to the question of how those capacities were in fact upgraded. This article develops a novel hypothesis, grounded in contemporary cognitive neuroscience, on which our theory of mind capacities improved as a result of an increase in our System-2 thinking capacities, in turn based in an increase in our working (...) memory capacities. I contrast this hypothesis with what would appear to be the default position among language evolution researchers, namely, that our theory of mind became more powerful as a result of genetic change to a domain-specific mindreading system which we share with other great apes. While the latter hypothesis is not implausible, it arguably enjoys less empirical support at present than does the alternative hypothesis I develop. (shrink)

ABSTRACTFast food chains such as McDonald's, KFC, and Burger King are major players in the production, marketing, and consumption of animal‐derived food throughout the world. Animal rights activists are quick to point out the link between the highly efficient factory farms that supply these chains and extreme animal cruelty and environmental degradation. Strategically, fast food is well positioned to leverage change in the methods by which animals are raised and processed for human consumption. Although progress has been made as the (...) fast food industry has responded to pressure exerted by animal rights organizations, there is little indication of true collaborative efforts that would harness the power of the market to bring about substantive changes in the way the consuming public views the issue of animal welfare and food production. (shrink)

In many traditional, small-scale societies, death and other misfortunes are commonly explained as a result of others’ malign occult agency. Here, we call this family of epistemic tendencies “the agential view of misfortune.” After reviewing several ethnographic case studies that illustrate this view, we argue that its origins and stability are puzzling from an evolutionary perspective. Not only is the agential view of misfortune false; it imposes costs on individuals and social groups that seem to far outweigh whatever benefits the (...) view might provide. We thus doubt that the agential view of misfortune is explainable in terms of adaptive effects. However, neither does it seem readily explainable as a consequence of belief formation strategies that are on the whole adaptive (as is plausibly the case for certain other of our false beliefs, including some that are costly). Accordingly, we contend that the commonness of the agential view of misfortune demands a special evolutionary explanation of some kind. We provide a partial explanation of this phenomenon by highlighting the adaptive benefits that often flow to occult specialists in environments where the agential view of misfortune is entrenched. What this does not explain, however, is the general lack of resistance we observe in response to occultists’ exploitative behaviours over (cultural) evolutionary timescales. We conclude by canvassing a few possible explanations for this puzzling lack of resistance, and while we commit ourselves to none, we do find one option more promising than the others. (shrink)

This brief essay explores how understanding the treatment of expert evidence requires engaging with its legal and political contexts, and not just focusing on its epistemological aspects. Although the law of evidence and thus its treatment of experts is significantly informed by epistemological considerations, it is also informed by concerns over the organization of trials, larger issues of intelligent governance, social concerns, and enforcement issues. These five aspects to the law of evidence give rise to principles to guide the explicit (...) structuring of the law of evidence that are identified here as well. This complexity helps to explain why the central issue of expert testimony is not the epistemological one of knowledge and belief but instead the conflict between educational and deferential modes of trial. (shrink)

Kinship plays a foundational role in organizing human social behavior on both local and more global scales. Hence, any adequate account of the evolution of human sociality must include an account of the evolution of human kinship. This article aims to make progress on the latter task by providing a few key pieces of an evolutionary model of kinship systems. The article is especially focused on the connection between primate social cognition and the origins of kinship systems. I argue that (...) early conceptions of kinship in our line were very likely scaffolded by preexisting forms of primate social cognition. It was only later, as linguistic resources increased in our line, and as human social life grew more complex, that these conceptions came to resemble kin categories as we now know them. I conclude by situating “kin cognition” within a broader cognitive science framework for studying capacities that reflect both innate knowledge and human cultural learning. (shrink)

According to one currently influential line of thinking, the evolution of ostensive communication was a prerequisite for the evolution of human language. In this article, I distinguish between a strong and a weak version of this view and offer a sustained argument against the former. More specifically, the strong version of this view would have it that ostensive communication was a prerequisite not just for the evolution of fully modern language but for any language-like system of communication. I argue that (...) this version is too strong: I show how some distinctive and important features of language may well have been assembled prior to the evolution of ostensive communication. Put another way, I argue that a protolanguage before ostensive communication scenario is a real possibility. I conclude by briefly arguing that such an evolutionary scenario coheres better with archaeological evidence from the early Pleistocene as well as evidence from developmental psychology pertaining to the nature of our mind reading abilities. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn April of 2000, Diana Levine went to a clinic in Vermont suffering from a migraine headache. She was given the drug Demerol for the migraine symptoms and Phenergan for nausea. Complications with the administration of Phenergan ultimately resulted in Ms. Levine contracting gangrene, necessitating the amputation of her right arm. Ms. Levine sued the drug maker, Wyeth Pharmaceutical, in state court and prevailed. The lower court's decision was appealed by Wyeth to the state supreme court where the ruling was (...) confirmed. Wyeth next appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which, to the surprise of many observers, affirmed the judgment of the state supreme court. At issue was the fundamental question of the ability of consumers to obtain redress against negligent manufacturers in state courts. Wyeth's arguments to the Court were based upon preemption: Foodand Drug Administration approval of a drug preempts the ability of injured consumers like Ms. Levine to recover in state courts despite years of precedent to the contrary. Ability to recover damages in state courts represents, perhaps, the most important safety net available to consumers injured by defective products. A ruling by the Supreme Court that FDA‐approved labeling of pharmaceuticals preempts the reach of the state courts would have severely compromised the balance of power between consumers and producers. (shrink)

The Association for Core Texts and Courses asserts its commitment to coming together and speaking about the scientific, the political, and the artistic to live together in an enlightened fashion. ACTC's Tenth Annual Conference re-affirmed and re-examined the value of serious reading and discussion focused through core texts.

Delving into the newly identified genre of the philosophical autobiography, Dr. Ronald J. Manheimer's 'Mirrors of the mind' takes both the neophyte and the initiated on a unique literary and philosophical journey through the works of important thinkers who have changed the world or, at least, how we perceive it. This guided tour of the life of the mind covers nine self-reflective narratives ranging from fourth century Augustine's 'Confessions' to 20th century Simone de Beauvoir's 'The prime of life.'"--Back cover.

Research Articles Ronald J. Pestritto, Social Philosophy and Policy, FirstView Article.

While ethicists have directed much attention to controversial biomedical issues--including euthanasia, abortion, and genetic engineering--they have largely ignored the less obvious, but more pervasive, everyday ethical problems faced by family physicians. Ethical Issues in Family Medicine addresses these problems, offering an ethics that reflects the distinctive features of family practice, and helping family physicians to appreciate the extent to which ethical issues influence their practice.

Forty years ago, Vaughn Ball demonstrated that the then received notion of conditional relevance served no useful purpose, as it would only come into effect if the probability of an element were 0.0. But, if the probability of an element were 0.0, a directed verdict would be in order and so once again conditional relevancy was doing no work. I extended that analysis to include the relationship between proffers of evidence and facts of consequence to demonstrate that the work that (...) conditional relevancy was supposedly doing was isomorphic to that done by relevancy in all significant ways, and yet the Federal Rules of Evidence provide different standards for the two situations to determine admissibility. I thus proposed an amendment to FRE 104(b) to provide for the same standard to be applied to ‘relevancy’ and ‘conditional relevancy’. In a recent article, Matthew Kotzen appears to subject this work to intense scrutiny and criticism, yet at the same time reaches, so far as I can tell, identical conclusions. This raises the question, which I examine, whether this is an example of cross-disciplinary difficulties in communication. (shrink)

The evolution of human communication and culture is among the most significant—and challenging—questions we face in attempting to understand the evolution of our species. This article takes up two frameworks for theorizing about human communication and culture, namely, Jackendoff's Parallel Architecture of the human language faculty, and the cultural evolutionary framework of Memetics. The aim is to show that the two frameworks uniquely complement one another in some theoretically important ways. In particular, the Parallel Architecture's account of the lexicon significantly (...) expands the range of linguistic phenomena that are plausibly covered by Memetics (e.g., from words to constructions and pure rules of syntax). At the same time, taking a “meme's-eye-view” of the lexicon retools the Parallel Architecture's treatment of the origins and subsequent cultural evolution of language. (shrink)

Following a series of national protests in support of an increase in the federal minimum wage, many fast food workers faced retaliation by their employers when they returned to work; schedules were changed, wages and hours were reduced, and some employees were terminated. These retaliatory actions resulted in a number of complaints being filed with the National Labor Relations Board alleging violations of the National Labor Relations Act. Several of the complaints were found to have merit and, additionally, in several (...) instances both the immediate employer, the franchisee, and the corporate organization of which it was a part, the franchisor, were named as co‐defendants. This ruling—that franchisors like McDonald’s USA—could be held jointly responsible for the labor violations of independent franchisees reversed a long‐standing precedent, whereby franchisees were regarded as independent contractors solely responsible for day‐to‐day labor practices, including compliance with federal and state labor statutes. Critics of the ruling argue that it will open the door to unionization and may well spell the end of the service‐sponsor franchising format. Supporters of the NLRB argue that the ruling is just and reflects new “industrial realities” in retail labor markets. Further, a case can be made that the NLRB’s position represents a step in the direction of the restoration of more equitable balance of power between labor and management. (shrink)

This paper reviews the literature on male backlash in organizations, proposing a research agenda. It defines backlash, examines its causes and manifestations, who is likely to exhibit it, and offers suggestions for addressing backlash. Backlash may be on the increase in organizations and society at large. Current efforts to weaken or remove the legislative support for employment equity initiatives are one sign of this.

While the term “metacognition” is sometimes used to refer to any form of thinking about thinking, in cognitive psychology, it is typically reserved for thinking about one’s own thinking, as opposed to thinking about others’ thinking. How metacognition in this more specific sense relates to other-directed mindreading is one of the main theoretical issues debated in the literature. This article considers the idea that we make use of the same or a largely similar package of resources in conceptually interpreting our (...) own mind as we do in interpreting others’. I assume that a capacity for other-directed mindreading is minimally shared with our great-ape relatives, but I argue that the architecture of this system had to be substantially modified before it could efficiently and adaptively be turned inwards on one’s own mind. I contend that an important piece of the overall evolutionary explanation here likely concerns selection pressures arising from the domain of conversational interaction. Specifically, drawing on work carried out in the human interaction studies tradition (e.g., conversation analysis), I argue that the smooth to-and-fro of conversational interaction can be seen to heavily depend on metacommunicative capacities, which, in turn, are underpinned by metacognitive capacities. I conclude with a thumbnail sketch of an evolutionary account of the emergence of these metacognitive capacities in the human line. Their appearance and spread – whether via genes, cultural learning, or more likely, some combination of the two – helps to explain the transition from great-ape communication to human conversation. (shrink)